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Abstract
Benefiting from access to detailed data on the federally run National Flood Insurance Program
for the entire state of Georgia, USA, we analyze flood insurance purchasing behavior in the 153
counties in that state over more than three decades (1978-2010). Estimates from a fixed effects
model show that the demand for flood insurance on an extensive margin, based on take-up rates,
is relatively price inelastic. Aligned with the behavioral economics literature, recent flood events
temporarily increase purchases, but this effect quickly fades. We also confirm that the
proportion of a county in a floodplain has a significant positive impact on insurance demand.
Contrary to what is often assumed, we do not find evidence that insurance purchase and
mitigation efforts are substitutes. More educated individuals, older ones and African-Americans
are, all else equal, more likely to purchase flood insurance.
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1. Introduction
Insurance is one of the widely recognized risk transfer tools for ex ante management of weather
disasters such as floods. In the United States, after private insurers decided to leave the flood
insurance market after the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 and after several decades of reliance
on government disaster relief, the federal government established the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP) in1968 (Dacy and Kunreuther, 1969; Michel-Kerjan, 2010). This national
program provides flood insurance coverage to residents of communities that adopt minimum
floodplain management policies. The program is managed by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) which maps flood risks and sets flood insurance premiums. As of
April 2014, there were over 5.4 million flood insurance policies-in-force in the U.S. managed
through this federal program.
While the program has been in operation for over forty-five years, academic research on
its operation and the demand for flood insurance through the NFIP is fairly recent. Browne and
Hoyt (2000) provide the first empirical analyses of homeowners' demand for flood insurance
through a state-level analysis across the country. Their empirical analysis suggests that both price
and income are influential factors in one’s decision to purchase flood insurance, and flood
insurance purchases at the state level are found to be highly correlated with the losses in the state
during the prior year. Kriesel and Landry (2004) use household-level data from coastal zones in
the United States to examine participation in NFIP for nine southeastern counties. They find
participation responsiveness to price to be inelastic. Expanding upon the analysis of Kriesel and
Landry (2004), Landry and Jahan-Parvar (2011) find a price-inelastic demand for flood
insurance and that higher income households are more likely to purchase flood insurance, a
finding that suggests that flood insurance is viewed as a normal good. Three studies have looked
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at specific states or cities. Zahran et al. (2009) show that household flood insurance purchases in
Florida correlate strongly with local government mitigation activities. Additionally, they also
show that NFIP policy take-up correlates positively with prior flood experience, local hazard
proximity conditions such as land area in floodplain, and the education attainment levels of
individuals in a locality. Michel-Kerjan and Kousky (2010) find that the majority of policies in
Florida are located within the FEMA-defined high risk floodplains. Kousky (2010) examines the
demand for flood insurance in St. Louis, Missouri and finds the take-up rates to increase with
more land in the high risk floodplains and the rates to decline with levee protection along major
rivers.
Building upon these earlier studies, we examine the demand for flood insurance using
county level flood insurance policies-in-force data in another coastal state, Georgia, which has
nearly $24 billion flood insurance coverage in force as of 2014. We expand on previous analyses
in a number of ways.
First, we explore a greater array of covariates in our analysis; in addition to controlling
for economic variables (income, price) and risk related variables (recent floods, risk reduction
efforts) as in earlier studies, we also control for demographic variables such as race, education
and age. To the best of our knowledge, race has never been tested as an explanatory variable
affecting flood insurance demand. This is surprising since it has been shown that minority groups
often differ in terms of world view, socioeconomic status, family organization and structure,
political efficacy and trust in social and political institutions compared to the majority group (see
Perry and Mushkatel, 2008, for instance). We might thus expect to find variations between race
representations in the decision to purchase flood insurance. If confirmed, this can have important
implications on the way flood risk and flood insurance are communicated to these different
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groups. Georgia presents an excellent case to do so since the state has a fairly high percentage of
minority compared to the national average (31% African-Americans versus 13% nationally).
Georgia indeed ranks third in the U.S. by the proportion of the state population that is African
American, after Mississippi (37%) and Louisiana (32%) (U.S. Census, 2010).
Earlier studies found that the adoption of disaster insurance increased with the level of
education (Kunreuther et al., 1978; Baumann and Sims, 1978); we will test whether this has
remained the case over time (since we analyze the period 1978-2010) and whether it applies
specifically to flood insurance.
Second, our empirical strategy controls for community participation in the NFIP, and also
the proportion of owner-occupied homes in a county, which is new. It is imperative to control for
the community participation in the NFIP as participation is mandatory to get the flood insurance
and having fewer participating communities in a county drives down the insurance take up rates.
Third, our analysis benefits from a much longer period of data and a larger sample size
compared to earlier studies which used only a few years of data and only a few counties to
examine the demand for flood insurance (for example Kriesel and Landry (2004) and Landry and
Jahn-Parvar (2011) used 1998-1999 survey data for nine coastal counties). Here we use extensive
data from 153 counties in Georgia for a period of 32 years (1978-2010) to examine the demand
for flood insurance.
We find evidence of price-inelastic demand for flood insurance and a positive income
effect. We also find that recent flood damages have a positive impact on the adoption of flood
insurance, consistent with Kunreuther’s (1996) hypothesis that risk perception influences
insurance purchasing decisions. Consistent with the availability heuristic (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1973), wherein people use the ease with which examples of a hazard can be brought
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to mind as a cue for estimating the probability of a hazard, we find that this impact vanishes over
time, though; the significance vanishes after 3 years. We find that publicly-funded mitigation
efforts (dollars spent by the government on flood mitigation per capita) have a positive but
insignificant effect on the decision to purchase flood insurance. This is contrary to insurance
theory that assumes insurance and mitigation to be substitutes (e.g., Ehrlich and Becker, 1972;
Mossin, 1968). Regarding the demographic variables, we find that the demand for flood
insurance increases with an increase in the proportion of African-Americans in a county, higher
education level and increasing age. The finding on race is important because this aspect has
never been tested before. The proportion of floodplain in a county is found to be positively
related to the number of policies purchased in a county whereas having fewer participating
communities in a county is negatively related to the number of policies purchase.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the operation of the National
Flood Insurance Program. Section 3 discusses our hypotheses based on the literature and the
data. Section 4 introduces our methodological approach. Section 5 discusses our results and
Section 6 concludes.

2. The National Flood Insurance Program
The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 created the NFIP as a voluntary partnership between
the federal government, communities and private insurers. The NFIP develops flood maps,
establishes the deductible/limit menu, and sets premiums, including subsidized premiums for
certain existing properties (Michel-Kerjan, 2010). Over 90 private insurers collaborate with the
program to sell flood insurance policies through their networks and provide claim adjustments.
They receive an allowance for doing so on behalf of the federal government but do not bear any
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risk. While there is a small private market for flood insurance, it represents only 5 percent of
what is sold through the NFIP (Dixon et al., 2006).
A significant problem with the NFIP lies in its implementation. Effective flood damage
prevention depends a great deal on the ability and willingness of community planners and
property owners to adapt to the program. In a survey conducted a decade after the NFIP was
established, it was found that only 12 percent or fewer responding individuals of a community
participating in the NFIP were aware of the building codes or land use regulations to mitigate
flood damage; and only 1 percent were aware of the insurance mechanism to manage flood risk
(Kunreuther et al, 1978). Using survey data, Chivers and Flores (2002) find evidence that the
overwhelming majority of households living in flood zones of Colorado were unaware of the
flood risk classification and flood insurance rates and requirements at the time they submitted
their bid to purchase property. Similarly, a recent study by Bin and Landry (2013) indicates that
homebuyers are unaware of flood risks and insurance requirements when bidding on properties
In addition to problems with the implementation of the NFIP, Hurricane Katrina in 2005
and Hurricane Sandy in 2012 demonstrated that federal flood insurance was insufficient to
secure all policy holders and restore the damage. Limitations on federal flood insurance
coverage1 and the unwillingness of homeowners’ insurance companies to pay for storm-related
damages left some policyholders unable to rebuild. Despite the limitations on federal flood
insurance coverage, Hurricane Katrina led to a debt of almost $18 billion to the U.S. Treasury. In
order to pay claims from Hurricane Sandy in 2012, the NFIP was forced to borrow even more; as
of July 2013 the NFIP’s debt is approximately $24 billion in total. The NFIP’s current debt and
the current premium structure have raised concerns regarding its long term financial solvency.

1

The NFIP’s dwelling form offers coverage for: Building property, up to 250,000 and Content up to 100,000.

6

Some advocacy groups have argued that the program disproportionately benefits wealthy
households with expensive waterfront properties, but with a few exceptions (e.g., Bin, Bishop
and Kousky, 2011), there has not been much research to determine who benefits from and who
bears the cost of the NFIP program.
In the years since Katrina, the NFIP has been at the forefront of the policy agenda.
Various proposals for reforming the NFIP have been suggested, including long-term contracts
tied to the property instead of one-year renewable policies tied to the individual homeowner
(Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2010), and using federal funds to compensate existing
landowners and targeting properties deemed high-risk or environmentally sensitive to purchase
flood insurance (Barnhizer, 2003). In 2012, Congress passed the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance
Reform Act (BW-12) with key provision to increase the existing flood insurance premium to
full-level risks. However, BW-12 was revised in March 2014 curbing the planned insurance rate
increase. The program is up for renewal again in 2019 and could benefit from a more solid
understanding of who is participating and thus will be affected by changes in the program.

3. Data and Hypotheses
3.1 Hypotheses
To establish the hypotheses of our empirical analysis we rely on findings from previous literature
as well as theories underpinning the demand for insurance. Previous studies have noted that
homeowners perceive the expenditure on insurance as a poor investment (Baumann and Sims,
1978; Johnson, 1978; Kunreuther et. al., 1978). Other research, both theoretical and empirical,
suggests a positive relationship between income and insurance purchases, and a negative
relationship between price and insurance purchases (Browne and Hoyt, 2000). We thus
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hypothesize that an increase in income will positively affect the decision to purchase flood
insurance, while an increase in the price of the premium will affect it negatively.
Subjective perception of risks – such as recent flooding – affects the decision to buy
flood insurance. Baumann and Sims (1978) find evidence that past experience with disasters
motivates insurance adoption. Similarly, Browne and Hoyt (2000); Dixon et al. (2006); and
Lindell and Hwang (2008) all find that flood experience serves as an immediate reminder of
exposure to flood risk, resulting in higher demand for flood insurance which is mostly attributed
to the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). On the other hand, the “gambler’s
fallacy”2 may lead some people to believe that the odds of another flood occurring in the area in
subsequent years have declined. We hypothesize that a recent flood will have a positive impact
on the decision to purchase flood insurance but based on the gambler’s fallacy, the relationship is
ambiguous.
Mitigation reduces the expected loss from flooding and, therefore, could reduce the
perceived need for flood insurance. In the case of flood damage, Burby (2006) provides
compelling evidence that actions taken by the federal government, such as building levees, make
residents feel safe. In such a case we expect to find a negative relationship between mitigation
assistance and the demand for flood insurance as found by Browne and Hoyt (2000). However,
Zahran et al., (2009) have shown that local government mitigation activities translate to flood
premium discounts leading to more people buying the flood insurance. There is also evidence
that the same people who behave in a less risky manner are also more likely to purchase
insurance (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006).

The “gambler's fallacy” is the belief that the probability of an event is lowered when that event has
recently occurred.
2
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No prior research tests for racial differences in the adoption of flood insurance. However,
in regard to life insurance, Gutter and Hatcher (2008) found that there is little difference in life
insurance ownership between black and white households, but that white households insure a
larger proportion of their human capital than do black households. In regard to tolerance of risk,
Sung and Hanna (1996) find that whites were more likely to be willing to take risk and that
blacks tend to be less risk tolerant. Survey research by Palm (1998) suggests that non-white
households exhibit a greater fear of disaster although it was unclear if that fear translates into the
purchase of flood insurance or any other mitigation activities. Thus, the racial difference in the
adoption of flood insurance is ambiguous and needs to be tested empirically.
As mentioned in the introduction section, the adoption of disaster insurance is found to be
positively related to the level of education (Kunreuther et al, 1978; Baumann and Sims, 1978).
Therefore, we hypothesize that a higher level of education will have a positive impact on the
demand for flood insurance. The impact of age on the adoption of flood insurance is unclear.
However, the findings of Riley and Chow (1992) that risk aversion rises at the age of 65 are
consistent with the demand for flood insurance increasing with age.
We hypothesize that the owner-occupied home status will be positively correlated with
the demand for flood insurance as for most homeowners, the house is a primary asset in their
portfolio (Flavin and Yamashita, 2002) and one would want to protect it.
Objective exposure to risk such as the proportion of floodplain in a county may affect the
decision to purchase flood insurance. We hypothesize that households in the floodplain demand
more flood insurance due to perceived risk of flood and therefore, this variable should have a
positive impact on the demand for flood insurance.
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Botzen et al. (2009) finds that homeowners are willing to make investments in mitigation
in exchange for premium discounts. In the US community participation in NFIP is required to get
the flood insurance and thus to be eligible for the premium discounts if certain mitigation
activities are undertaken. Therefore we hypothesize that the demand for flood insurance will be
in reverse proportion to the number of communities within the county that do not participate in
the NFIP.
Table 1 presents the variables that are expected to affect the flood insurance purchasing
decision and their hypothesized signs.
Table 1: Hypotheses: Flood Insurance Purchasing Decision
Variables

Hypothesized Sign

Results

Income

+

+

Price

-

-

Recent Flood Event

+/-

+

Mitigation

+/-

+

Race

+/-

Education

+

+ (for African-American) &
- (for Whites)
+

Age

+/-

+

Home Occupancy (Owner)

+

-

Percent of Floodplain in a County

+

+

NFIP Non-Participation

-

-

3.2. Data
We collected our data from several sources. County-level data on NFIP policies-in-force from
1978-2010 was provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency which runs the
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National Flood Insurance Program.3 The dataset includes flood insurance premium collected,
flood insurance coverage in force, flood mitigation assistance provided to residents in that
county, all for a given year, and a GIS file with floodplain maps for all the counties in Georgia.
Ideally, we would have performed the analysis using household-level data, but for privacy
reasons, data at this level of disaggregation is not available from the federal government which
runs the program. We use county-level data that provides more information than the state level
data that previous studies have used. Table 2 shows the total policies-in-force, premium and
coverage for years 1978-2010 in Georgia. Over this period, the number of NFIP flood insurance
policies-in-force has increased almost 9-fold, from about 10,500 to over 91,000 (nearly nine
times the population growth in the state over that period). As of 2010, the last year covered by
the study, there was nearly $24 billion of flood insurance coverage in place through the NFIP in
Georgia.

3

The authors thank Susan Bernstein, Esq., I&PR Mitigation Directorate, NFIP, FEMA, DHS for providing the data.
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Table 2: NFIP Policies-In-Force, Premium and Coverage in Georgia from 1978-2010

Year
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

Policies-In-Force
(PIF)
10,502
13,348
14,570
14,563
15,036
15,596
16,774
18,018
19,706
20,396
21,271
23,069
32,741
28,129
29,383
31,400
39,337
42,761
46,445
50,725
54,655
58,318
61,600
62,718
63,730
65,618
68,106
74,387
81,607
84,047
85,632
90,602
91,131

Premium
Collected
(2010 $)
861,713
1,105,861
1,250,727
1,921,371
2,771,714
2,905,571
3,391,955
3,895,232
4,651,514
5,267,443
5,595,801
6,467,600
9,128,278
8,756,679
9,744,305
10,803,381
13,974,896
16,511,970
19,206,888
22,613,901
25,853,306
27,262,323
28,446,564
29,442,985
30,852,160
33,396,557
35,963,182
39,881,447
45,786,366
50,360,780
54,860,728
59,427,670
63,256,224

Coverage
(2010 $ in
thousands)
343,034
472,011
578,935
651,969
711,642
783,435
938,647
1,228,856
1,498,005
1,665,969
1,839,428
2,388,232
3,170,013
2,805,169
2,963,670
3,337,091
4,205,946
5,049,496
5,938,711
6,932,214
7,813,618
8,779,346
9,768,575
10,511,775
11,221,265
12,041,183
13,520,381
15,700,573
18,320,810
19,856,870
20,894,858
22,533,477
23,047,444
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Data on total flood damage per capita in previous years was collected from SHELDUS, a
county-level hazard dataset derived from the National Climatic Data Centre.4 The sociodemographic variables: Income, Race, Education, and Age come from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis and the U.S. Census Bureau. The variable Income is available annually; for Race,
Education and Age we interpolated decennial data from the U.S. Census Bureau on to get yearly
estimates.5
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of the variables included in the model. The average
number of policies-in-force per thousand population at the county level was 4.95.6 The average
per capita income over the period 1978-2010 was almost $26,000 (2010 prices). The average
cost was $4.46 per $1,000 of flood insurance coverage (2010 prices) and it ranged widely across
the state from less than a dollar to over $30. Browne and Hoyt (2000) in their state-level study
found the average cost per thousand dollars of insurance to be $5.12. Similarly, Kriesel and
Landry (2004) in their study of nine coastal counties find the cost to be $4.3. Michel-Kerjan
(2010) shows that as of 2010, the average cost nationwide was $2.64 and was $2.05, $2.09,
$3.00, $2.92, $3.70, $2.34 for the coastal states of Florida, Texas, Louisiana, California and New
Jersey respectively.
The mean flood damage per capita during the preceding flooding event was $10.99;
Brown and Hoyt (2000) found the mean flood damage per capita in the preceding year to be
$9.825.

4

SHELDUS refers to Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for United States. Details on how the data is
collected can be found at http://webra.cas.sc.edu/hvri/products/sheldusmetadata.aspx.
5
We calibrated an exponential curve to the decennial data (1980, 1990, and 2000) for each county. Using a linear
curve to estimate the data, however, did not change the results.
6
There is a large difference in market penetration between coastal counties (21 policies-in-force per 1000
population) and inland counties (only 2 policies-in-force per 1000 population).
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FEMA's Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration (FIMA) implements a variety
of programs authorized by Congress to reduce losses that may result from natural disasters. We
find that on average only $0.004 per capita was spent on flood mitigation by FEMA.
On average 14.34% of the county areas are located in a floodplain with a minimum of
2.03% (Macon County) and a maximum of 72.24% (Glynn County).
Table 3: Variables and Descriptive Statistics for County-level Analysis (1978-2010)
Mean
4.95
25.5

Std.
Dev.
19.25
6.13

Min
0.01
12.22

Max
240.28
65.91

4.46

2.39

0.37

30.38

Recent_Flood
Mitigation

Description
Policies-in-force per 1000 population
Per capita Income (in thousands, 2010
constant dollars)
Cost per 1000 dollars of coverage (2010
price)
Flood damage per capita in prior year ($)
Flood Mitigation Assistance per capita ($)

10.99
0.004

113.00
0.083

0
0

3986.23
3.366

African-American %
White %
High school grads
College grads
Occu_Owner %
Occu_Renter %
Age25to44
Age45to64
Age 65 & up

Percent of African-Americans
Percent of white
Percent of high school graduates
Percent of college graduates
Percent of Owner Occupied households
Percent of Renter Occupied households
Percent of age group 25 to 44
Percent of age group 45 to 64
Percent of age group 65 & up

25.60
69.00
32.81
13.16
58.92
41.08
32.20
21.12
11.08

17.17
16.52
5.36
7.06
12.71
12.71
6.39
4.36
3.54

0
18.9
16.5
4.24
0
12.45
16.9
1.32
0.43

82.99
98.8
54
48.1
87.54
100
66.96
34.7
29.2

Floodplain %
Bl_Ridge
Ri_Valley
Piedmont
SE_Plains
Co_Plain

Percent of the county in a floodplain
1 if Blue Ridge Eco-region, Else 0
1 if Ridge and Valley Eco-region, Else 0
1 if Piedmont Eco-region, Else 0
1 if South East Plains Eco-region, Else 0
1 if Coastal Plain Eco-region, Else 0

14.34
0.042
0.052
0.425
0.374
0.104

12.91
0.20
0.22
0.49
0.48
0.30

2.03
0
0
0
0
0

72.24
1
1
1
1
1

No NFIP
Participation

Number of communities in the county
that do not participate in the NFIP

0.62

1.06

0

6

Variable
PIF/1000pop
Income
Price
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Table 4 reports the comparison of the summary statistics between the coastal and inland
counties. We find much higher market penetration in coastal counties of the state. The cost per
$1,000 of insurance coverage was not statistically different between inland and coastal counties,
indicating that the level of risk is, according to the FEMA risk mapping, not that different on
average (even though the risk perception might be). We found that the mean flood damage per
capita was actually higher in inland counties ($11.86) compared to coastal counties ($6.63). It is
worth mentioning that all the significant flood events during our period, such as Albany (1994
and 1998) and Atlanta (2009), occurred in inland counties.
We find that the amount per capita spent on mitigation was much higher for the coastal
counties; a 5-to-1 ratio compared to spending in inland counties.
Interestingly, we find no significant differences among the socio-economic variables
between coastal and inland counties.
Table 4: Variables and Descriptive Statistics: Coastal Counties Vs. Inland Counties
Variables
PIF/1000pop
Income ($ thousands)
Price
Recent_Flood
Mitigation
African-American%
White %
High school grads
College grads
Occu_Owner %
Occu_Renter %
Age 25 to 44
Age 45 to 64
Age 65 & up
Floodplain %
No NFIP Participation

Coastal Counties
Mean
Std. Dev.
20.53
43.43
23.32
5.94
4.16
2.14
6.63
57.56
0.01
0.14
26.59
11.10
69.62
11.91
34.88
5.56
11.45
5.32
60.31
12.64
39.68
12.64
32.08
5.40
19.71
4.75
10.03
3.50
31.37
21.21
0.49
0.87

Inland Counties
Mean
Std. Dev.
1.83
3.05
26.40
6.66
4.52
2.43
11.86
121.07
0.002
0.07
25.40
18.14
68.87
17.29
32.39
5.22
13.51
7.32
58.63
12.71
41.36
12.71
32.23
6.58
17.03
3.64
12.94
1.84
10.93
6.37
0.64
1.09
15

4. Methods
4.1 Econometric Model
Based on the data described above we analyze the demand for flood insurance across 153
counties7 in Georgia for the period 1978-2010. We estimate the following demand equation:

log( PIF / 1000 pop) it   0   i  1 log( Income) it   2 log( price) it
  3 Re cent _ flood it   4 log( Mitigation )   5 PercentFPi

(1)

   Ecoregions i   6 Race it   7 Education it   8 Ageit   it
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of flood insurance policies-in-force (PIF)
purchased per 1,000 population in a county-year.8 The income variable (log (Income)) is the log
of per capita income in the county during the year. We measured the cost per $1,000 of flood
insurance coverage (Price) by dividing the dollar value of the premium paid for flood insurance
in the county during the year by the dollar value of insurance coverage (in thousands) in the
county during the year.
According to the availability heuristic, recent large flood events could heighten risk
perceptions and this could influence the decision to purchase flood insurance. To control for the
effect of recent flooding on individuals' demand for flood insurance we use the variable
Recent_Flood that measures the dollar value of total flood damage per capita in the county
during the preceding year. Atreya et al. (2013) and Bin and Landry (2013) find that large flood
events result in a flood-risk discount for properties in floodplains but that this effect vanishes
over time, as early as four years after the flood (Atreya et al. 2013). To capture this decay, we
included up to six-year lags for the Recent_Flood variable. The Flood Mitigation Assistance

7

Out of 159 counties in Georgia 153 counties were included in the analysis since the data were missing for 6
counties: Clay, Lincoln, Marion, Schley, Treutlen and Webster.
8
Following Zahran et al. (2009), we replaced the dependent variable with the number of policies-in-force per 100
households in a county as a robustness test to our results.
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(FMA) program of FEMA provides funds to assist states and communities implement measures
that reduce or eliminate the long term risk of flood damage to buildings, manufactured homes,
and other structures insured under NFIP. To measure the effect of such assistance on the decision
to purchase flood insurance, we included per capita flood mitigation assistance by FEMA per
county-year (Mitigation)
Using zonal analysis in Arc GIS we determined the percentage of county land within the
100-year floodplain (Percent FP).9 More than one-third of the policies in Georgia are purchased
by residents outside of a high-risk 100-year flood zone. The decision to buy flood insurance
could also depend on whether the county is coastal or is located inland. Dixon et al, 2006, found
a significant regional variation and higher market penetration in coastal counties. We control for
regional variation in Georgia by including dummies for the five eco-regions in Georgia: Blue
Ridge, Ridge and Valley, Piedmont, Southeast Plains; the control group being the southern
coastal plains. This distinction separates the higher elevation Blue Ridge, Ridge and Valley, and
Piedmont from the low-lying southeast plains and southern coastal plains.
All the regressions include the socio-demographic characteristics of the households at the
county level. Race is measured with two variables, one for the percent of the population who is
African-American and one for the percent of white population in a county. The Education
variable measures the percent of high school graduates and the percent of college graduates in a
county. Three different Age categories are included in the model: age groups 25 to 44, 45 to 64,
and 65 & up. All these variables are entered as the percentage of total population in a county.
We also include the percentage of houses in the county that are rented and the percentage of
houses that are owner-occupied. The distinction between the owner-occupied and non-owner

9

100-year floodplain was used since flood insurance is mandatory for the 100 year floodplain properties only.
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occupied properties is important since a substantial portion of the non-owner occupied properties
are located in flood zones.
Lastly, to control for the fact that community participation is required for homeowners to
be able to buy the flood insurance, we included a variable NoNFIP in our model which is the
number of communities in a county that do not participate in the NFIP.

4.2 Estimation Methods
We estimate equation (1) using a linear regression model that included county fixed effects (FE).
That is, in equation (1) αi denotes a county-specific intercept that controls for unobserved
characteristics at the county level that are constant over time. We note, however, that the location
in the floodplain variable (“Percent FP”), the Eco-region dummies and the NoNFIP variable do
not vary over time and drop from the FE model. Thus, we estimated equation (1) using randomeffects (RE) when the model included these time-invariant variables.10 A Hausman test failed to
reject the null that the coefficient estimated by the efficient RE estimator are the same as the
ones estimated by the consistent FE estimator (χ2=19.25, p-value=0.99), and thus it was safe to
use the RE model over the FE model. With over 30 years of data, serial autocorrelation is a
concern in our model. We performed a Wooldridge test (Wooldridge, 2002; Drukker, 2003) and
found evidence of serial autocorrelation (F=130.40, p-value<0.001). The RE panel regression is
inappropriate given the presence of serial autocorrelation. Thus, following Zahran et al. 2009, we
estimated a Prais-Winsten Regression with Correlated Standard Errors (PCSE) model which is
preferred over pooled OLS if serial autocorrelation is present.

10

The floodplain maps in Georgia have not been updated in years. Georgia started a map modernization program in
partnership with FEMA in 2009 to develop and update flood hazard maps for all its counties.
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5. Results
5.1 Market Penetration
We first estimate county-level market penetration rates, that is, the proportion of
households in a county that have purchased flood insurance. As expected, flood insurance market
penetration rates are highest in coastal counties where the proportion of land in the floodplain is
higher. This result supports the finding by Dixon et al. (2006) that the probability of purchasing
insurance is substantially higher in communities subject to coastal flooding than in communities
that are not. Kousky (2010) also finds a higher market penetration in census tracts with more
land in the 100-year and 500-year floodplains in St. Louis County, Missouri.
Figure 1 shows market penetration rates by county for 2010. We divided the total number
of residential policies-in-force by the total number of household with data from the 2010 U.S.
Census. The top five counties with the highest percentage of market penetration in 2010 were
Glynn (44.86%), Bryan (40.28%), Chatham (27.42%), Camden (19.22%), and McIntosh
(10.50%).
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FIGURE 1: FLOOD INSURANCE MARKET PENETRATION IN GEORGIA, 2010
Source: Author prepared map based on data provided by FEMA
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Not surprisingly, there is a strong correspondence between the market penetration and the
proportion of floodplain area within a county.11 The coastal counties where the percentage of
floodplain is larger tend to have the highest penetration rates (Figure 1 and Table 5), most likely
because the purchase of flood insurance is mandatory for properties in 100-year floodplains with
a mortgage from a federally backed or regulated lender and because residents may be more
aware of the risk they face. Our measure of market penetration, however, refers to the total
number of properties in a county, and not specifically to those in the floodplain. Another factor
that could potentially explain the market penetration rate is a recent flooding event in a county.
Previous studies (Kriesel and Landry, 2004; Carbone, Hallstrom, and Smith, 2006; Petrolia,
Landry, and Coble, 2013) suggest that the sensitivity to flood risk is heightened by experience
with hazard events. Atreya et al (2013) find that after a significant flood event ("the flood of the
century") in 1994 in Dougherty County, GA, the take up rates increased dramatically. Dougherty
is precisely the county with the largest market penetration among inland counties in Georgia
(Figure 1).

Table 5: Percent of Floodplain Area and Market Penetration Rate (Top 5) in Georgia
(2010)
County
Glynn
Chatham
Camden
Bryan
Ware

11

Floodplain (%)
72.24
72.22
54.68
54.14
52.43

County
Glynn
Bryan
Chatham
Camden
McIntosh

Market Penetration (%)
44.86
40.28
27.42
19.22
10.50

The correlation coefficient between the two is 0.70.
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5.2 Regression Results
We report the results of the estimation of equation (1) in Table 6. The first column shows the
estimates from the FE model. We compare these results with those from a RE model in the
second column. In the third column we estimate a RE model that includes important timeinvariant variables that drop from the FE model: Percent FP, the Eco-region dummies and No
NFIP participation. In column four, we present the results of a Prais-Winsten Regression with
Correlated Standard Errors (PCSE).In column five, we present the results of a Prais-Winsten
Regression with the alternative dependent variable (PIF/100 households).
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Table 6: Regression Results (Dependent Variable: Policies-in-force/1000 population)
VARIABLES

Ln (Income)
Ln (Price)
Ln (Recent_Flood)
L. Ln (Recent_Flood)
L2. Ln (Recent_Flood)
L3. Ln (Recent_Flood)
L4. Ln (Recent_Flood)
L5. Ln (Recent_Flood)
Mitigation
High school grad %
College grad %
Black %
White %

FE

RE

RE + time invariant
controls

Prais-Winsten

(1)

(2 )

(3)

( 4)

Prais_Winsten
(dependent:PIF/
100 housholds)
(5)

0.258
(0.200)
-0.306***
(0.0397)
0.0160**
(0.00793)
0.0174**
(0.00772)
0.0153*
(0.00793)
0.00301
(0.00797)
0.00743
(0.00767)
0.000839
(0.00783)
0.0730
(0.0700)
0.0504***
(0.00584)
0.0303***
(0.00812)
0.0175***
(0.00342)
-0.00918**
(0.00426)

0.330*
(0.197)
-0.301***
(0.0398)
0.0167**
(0.00803)
0.0179**
(0.00782)
0.0160**
(0.00803)
0.00363
(0.00807)
0.00774
(0.00776)
0.00128
(0.00793)
0.0772
(0.0709)
0.0501***
(0.00581)
0.0363***
(0.00770)
0.0137***
(0.00323)
-0.00392
(0.00381)

0.0216**
(0.00999)
0.0653***
(0.0145)
0.102***
(0.0179)

0.0178*
(0.00969)
0.0563***
(0.0139)
0.0759***
(0.0164)

-7.448***
(2.079)
Yes

-8.324***
(1.984)
Yes

0.418**
(0.196)
-0.293***
(0.0396)
0.0167**
(0.00802)
0.0180**
(0.00781)
0.0163**
(0.00802)
0.00358
(0.00806)
0.00751
(0.00775)
0.00106
(0.00792)
0.0834
(0.0709)
0.0511***
(0.00577)
0.0406***
(0.00755)
0.0143***
(0.00318)
-0.00505
(0.00376)
-0.0115*
(0.00683)
0.0208**
(0.00957)
0.0642***
(0.0137)
0.0670***
(0.0157)
0.115
(0.607)
0.516
(0.576)
-1.285***
(0.442)
-0.913**
(0.416)
0.0400***
(0.0102)
-0.321***
(0.0782)
-8.143***
(2.035)
Yes

2,887
0.668
138

2,887
0.66
138

2,887
0.66
138

0.274
(0.230)
-0.136***
(0.0295)
0.0268***
(0.00443)
0.0247***
(0.00564)
0.0230***
(0.00617)
0.00719
(0.00610)
0.00886
(0.00558)
0.00496
(0.00446)
0.0148
(0.0339)
0.0189
(0.0147)
0.0584***
(0.0144)
0.00879*
(0.00476)
-9.55e-05
(0.00277)
-0.00203
(0.00687)
0.0225
(0.0230)
0.0394
(0.0308)
0.0456
(0.0324)
-0.178
(0.585)
0.0415
(0.537)
-1.537***
(0.419)
-0.963**
(0.387)
0.0345***
(0.00944)
-0.267***
(0.0741)
-6.025**
(2.489)
Yes
0.95
2,887
0.181

0.0479
(0.230)
-0.141***
(0.0295)
0.0266***
(0.00444)
0.0247***
(0.00565)
0.0227***
(0.00618)
0.00692
(0.00611)
0.00853
(0.00560)
0.00490
(0.00447)
0.0154
(0.0339)
0.0122
(0.0147)
0.0655***
(0.0142)
0.0121**
(0.00473)
-0.000146
(0.00277)
-0.000965
(0.00678)
-0.00285
(0.0229)
0.0175
(0.0306)
0.0560*
(0.0321)
-0.265
(0.577)
0.144
(0.529)
-1.581***
(0.414)
-0.958**
(0.382)
0.0341***
(0.00931)
-0.254***
(0.0731)
-4.293*
(2.470)
Yes
0.95
2,887
0.317

Occu_Owner %
Age25_44
Age45_64
Age65_up
Bl_Ridge dummy
Ri_Valley
Piedmont dummy
SE_Plains dummy
Floodplain %
No NFIP Participation
Constant
Year Fixed Effects
Rho
Observations
R-squared
Number of id

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The empirical analysis supports the hypothesis that income and price significantly
influence the decision to buy flood insurance. The estimated income elasticity in the RE models
ranges between 0.33 and 0.42. The estimated coefficient for the price elasticity of insurance
(where price is measured by the cost per $1,000 dollars of coverage) is negative and statistically
significant at a 1% level across all models, with point estimates ranging between
-0.14 (column 4) and -0.31 (column 1). This is broadly consistent with previous studies at the
state level (Browne and Hoyt, 2000) and individual level (Kriesel and Landry, 2004).
Our empirical findings also suggest that, as expected, flood damage in previous years has
a significant positive impact on the decision to buy flood insurance. This effect is significant for
damages up to three years back. (Replacing per capita damage in previous years by the number
of flood events in the county did not change the results). This result is consistent with Zahran et
al. 2009, who find a positive impact of previous flood damage on the decision to buy flood
insurance.
We find a positive but insignificant relationship between flood mitigation assistance and
flood insurance purchases at the county level which is in contrary to a general assumption that
the mitigation and insurance are substitutes.
Regarding the characteristics of the households, education has a significant impact on
flood insurance purchases. The results suggest that for the average county, a unit change in the
percent of college graduates is associated with over a 3% (6.5 % in column 5) increase in NFIP
policies per 1000 population. We find that an increase in the proportion of African-American
population in a county is also associated with an increased demand for flood insurance. To put
this in perspective, a 1 percentage point increase in the African-American population in a county
is associated with a 1% increase in flood insurance policies. The variable age also a statistically
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significant effect in the RE regression. For example, in column 3, a one percentage point
increase in the age group 25 to 44 in the average county is associated with an approximately 2%
increase in the policies-in-force per 1000-population. This increase is 6.4% for the age group 4564 and 6.7% for the age group 65 and above. However, these results are not robust to controlling
for serial autocorrelation in column 4 and 5 except for percentage of black population and age
group 65 and up. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that an increase in owner-occupied homes
in a county is associated with decreased flood insurance policies-in-force (significant at 10%
level in the RE regression). This result may be attributable to tax benefits of owning rental
properties, that is, landlords get to deduct insurance from income, which homeowners do not.
Also, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (2007), roughly one-quarter of the
coastal properties with subsidized flood insurance are not primary residences and 20% of the
NFIP flood insurance contracts were for non-principal residences which could also be driving
our results.
A result that is robust across models is the positive relationship between the proportion of
floodplain and the policies-in-force in a county, implying that people in vulnerable counties , are
in fact more likely to buy flood insurance. According to our results, a unit increase in the percent
of floodplain area in a county increases the NFIP policy purchases per 1000 population by
approximately 3.5%. In addition, we controlled for different eco-regions and also controlled for
the number of communities in a county that do not participate in the NFIP. We find that
compared to coastal plains in Georgia, other eco-regions buy fewer flood insurance policies. The
results were robust to including a dummy for coastal counties.12 As expected, an increase in the

12

Results available upon request.
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number of communities that do not participate in the NFIP is associated with a drop in the
number of policies-in-force per county.

6. Conclusions
U.S. Congress created the NFIP to mitigate flood losses through community-enforced building
and zoning ordinances and to provide access to affordable, federally backed flood insurance
protection to homeowners. The program is not structured to build a capital surplus nor is it able
to purchase reinsurance to cover catastrophic losses. Intended to be funded with premiums
collected from policyholders, the NFIP remained solvent until 2005 when Hurricane Katrina
struck and led to billions in debt.
Our analysis of the factors that influence Georgia homeowners’ decisions to purchase
flood insurance should contribute to the emerging research literature aiming to better understand
the drivers of flood insurance purchases in the United States and abroad. We were also able to
depict market penetration in the state of Georgia.
Unsurprisingly, the flood insurance market penetration rate is higher in coastal counties
than inland. More generally, our analysis at the county level for the period 1978-2010 suggests
that, as we would expect, the counties with higher proportion of land within floodplains purchase
more flood insurance policies. We also find the price elasticity of flood insurance to be fairly low
(at -0.31, -0.14) suggesting that those exposed the most want that coverage. At a time when
issues of affordability are at the forefront of the NFIP’s reform debate, the result that an increase
in the price of premium do not highly impact the take-up of flood insurance can help
policymakers make informed policy decisions.
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Our findings suggest that other determinants of risk perception, such as having
experienced recent flood events, have a positive significant effect on the number of policies-inforce purchased, supporting the hypothesis of the availability heuristic. A recent flood event can
be easily brought to mind and therefore heightens the perceived probability of a future flood
which eventually leads to purchasing flood insurance. We also tested the impact of race and
found that areas with higher concentration of African-Americans had, all things being equal, a
higher demand for flood insurance. It would be interesting to perform a similar analysis at the
level of the entire United States and in other countries. Indeed, FEMA flood risk awareness
campaigns have never segmented target audience by race. Our analysis suggest that it might be
important to do so.
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